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Introspection is often seen as criterion to 
distinguish between theory theory (TT) and simulation 
theory (ST). Many empirical arguments against ST rely 
upon the thesis that ST is introspectionist and that it 
presupposes the Cartesian dictum that the mind is 
transparent to itself. According to Perner 1999 the capacity 
to introspect is so important for ST that it can be seen as 
the criterion that distinguishes ST from TT: "These two 
positions and their sub-varieties differ as to whether they 
presuppose or explain the ability to introspect. Theory 
theory is extremely anti-introspectionist. Traditional 
simulation is based on the ability to introspect one's own 
mental states." (Perner 1999) 
The introspectionism-thesis and the transparency-
of-the-mind-thesis together form the basis for different 
experimenta crucis in which the following empirical 
hypothesis is deduced from ST: If ST is right the child 
would first develop the capacity to understand its own 
mental states and only later develop the capacity to 
understand (or to successfully ascribe) other person's 
mental states. (Gopnik & Astington 1988, Gopnik & 
Wellman 1995) The fact that both capacities emerge at the 
same time is taken as a refutation of ST and a confirmation 
of TT. (Perner 1999, Gordon 1995)  
The thesis that introspectionism is a criterion for 
the distinction between ST and TT has been criticized by 
some adherents of ST – like R. M. Gordon. Gordon 
maintains that introspection is not a prerequisite for 
simulation. For Gordon, introspection always presupposes 
a theory because in order to introspectively identify a 
mental state one has to know the type of this state; the 
knowledge of the type of a mental state is something that 
presupposes a theoretical framework of mental concepts. 
According to Gordon, simulation is not based upon 
theoretical knowledge about one's own or other people's 
mental states, or knowledge about the correlations of 
certain mental states to other mental states, or certain 
kinds of behavior. Simulation does not require 
introspection, it demands an "ascent routine" of identifying 
mental states and using them for simulation. (Gordon 
1995b) Gordon denies the thesis that ST is 
introspectionist. But it remains undisputed that TT is 
extremely anti-introspectionist. In my paper I would like to 
question this anti-introspectionist view of TT. Is there any 
reason for a theory theorist to be anti-introspectionist? If 
there is, is it a good reason? 
I think the only reason for a theory theorist to be 
anti-introspectionist is the special character of TT itself. 
Folk psychology (FP) is defined in TT as "a conceptual 
framework ... used by ordinary people to understand, 
explain and predict their own and other people's behavior 
and mental states." (Eckardt 1994, 300) In TT FP is seen 
as an explanatory system that can be compared with other 
theoretical systems (e.g. of natural science). 
There is, however, a difficulty with FP when it is 
compared with other theories: A folk-psychological 
explanation can be compared with a scientific one only if 
there is empirical evidence for testing the different 
explanatory hypotheses. A law-like generalization or 
hypothesis can only be tested if it is possible to verify the 
presence of all relevant antecedentia which together form 
the explanans. The intersubjective access to all (relevant) 
explanantia of a theoretical hypothesis is a necessary 
condition for the objective valuation of its explanatory 
power. (Stegmüller 1969, 86ff.) But the intersubjective 
access to the antecedent conditions of folk-psychological 
explanations would be impossible if some of them could be 
verified only in an act of introspection.  
Introspection cannot be accepted as a 
precondition for a successful mental explanation if FP is 
basically seen as a theoretical hypothesis for the 
explanation of human behavior. As a theory it has to be 
independent of the psychological characteristics of its 
users, which are available only in an act introspection. This 
independence is what A. Goldman calls the attributor-
neutral heuristics of FP in TT. (Goldman 2000) Therefore, 
the reason for the anti-introspectionism of theory theorists 
is their belief that FP is essentially a theory and as such 
independent from the properties of the person who is 
applying the theory. If folk-psychological explanations 
would presuppose the ability to introspect one's own 
mental states it would lose its theoretical, intersubjective 
status.  
Is this belief justified? Do folk psychological 
explanations necessarily lose their attributor-neutrality 
when they presuppose the ability to introspect one's own 
mental states? Must everybody who emphasizes the role 
of introspection in folk psychological explanations share 
the Cartesian dictum of the transparency of the mind? 
As a counterexample I would like to mention 
Eliminative Materialism (EM) for the following reasons: 
a) Eliminative materialists are theory theorists. TT is a 
necessary condition for a successful elimination of FP: 
Only if FP is basically an explanatory theory, it can be 
compared with other theories with regard to its explanatory 
power. The superiority of the explanations of, for example, 
neuroscience over folk-psychological explanations could 
then be proved on the basis of the empirical success of 
neuroscience. 
b) Eliminative Materialists do not believe at all in 
the transparency of the mind. In EM introspection is seen 
as a totally inadequate instrument to gain knowledge about 
internal cognitive processes.  
c) Eliminative Materialists even argue explicitly for 
the attributor-neutrality of FP: 
Knowledge of other minds thus has no essential 
dependence on knowledge of one's own mind. 
Applying the principles of our folk psychology to our 
behavior, a Martian could justly ascribe to us the 
familiar run of mental states, even though his own 
psychology were very different from ours. He would 
not, therefore, be "generalizing from his own case." 
(Churchland 1990, 208) 
 
An analysis of Churchland's statement makes 
clear that attributor-neutrality does not imply a non-
introspective attitude toward FP. Churchland's Martian 
acquires a new access to his internal states with the 
principles of FP. Together with FP he acquires a "special 
habit of conceptual response to … [his] internal states", 
called introspection. This habit of conceptual response "is 
always contingent on (the integrity of) the acquired 




conceptual framework (theory) in which the response is 
framed." (Churchland 1990, 208) 
According to this position every perception 
basically depends on the respective underlying theoretical 
framework. This position can be called "theory-holism" 
because it does not distinguish sharply between the 
theoretical and the empirical domain. In the view of theory-
holism sentences like, “there is a subject who is aware of 
certain mental states”, “my mental states cannot be 
observed from outside” etc., are expressions of implicit 
assumptions of an underlying folk-psychological 
framework. These implicit assumptions can be compared 
with the paradigmatic principles of scientific theories and 
do not only determine the modes of reasoning but also the 
modes of perception. 
One consequence of the influence of the implicitly 
given theoretical assumptions in folk psychology, 
according to this position, is the special theoretical 
character of the perceived evidence: The tacit theory of 
folk psychology divides perception in two different types - 
outer perception and inner perception. Awareness or 
consciousness of one's own inner mental states is only 
possible within the theoretical framework of folk 
psychology. According to this theory-holistic position the 
antecedent conditions of many folk-psychological 
hypotheses are given primarily through this special sort of 
theory-laden perception called "introspection". "Insofar as 
introspective judgments are just a species of observation 
judgment then, there is no problem at all about the 
theoretical nature of the concepts they characteristically 
involve." (Churchland 1979, 96) This form of perception 
presupposes that certain objects (the mental ones) are 
internal and other objects (the physical ones) are external. 
It would seem clear that the impression of a "privileged 
access" to these inner mental objects can arise only in this 
theoretical context. Because of the intrinsic connection 
between introspection and the tacit theoretical 
assumptions of folk psychology, instead of a gradual 
correction of introspection-based knowledge, the entire 
folk-psychological theoretical system is supposed to be 
eliminated together with its theory-laden introspective 
evidence. Within the framework of eliminative materialism 
the introspected mental states are shown to be 
theoretically dependent on folk-psychological assumptions, 
and if we change the underlying folk-psychological 
framework (in favor of a more sophisticated 
neurophysiological one, for example) the inner states that 
we perceive will be different (perhaps there are no more 
'inner' states in the former sense). 
"If our conceptual framework for P-states is an 
empirical theory, then it is possible, at the limit, that 
said theory be wholly false, that there are no such 
things as P-states, that all of our introspective 
judgments have been systematically false by reason of 
presupposing a false background theory." (Churchland 
1979, 96) 
 
It is clear that the radical position of EM regarding 
the future of FP is very problematic. In this paper I do not 
want to comment or criticize Churchland's belief in the 
elimination of FP through neuroscience. What is important 
for our question "how introspectionist is TT?", are the 
following points: In EM we have a conception of TT that 
presupposes the ability to introspect one's own mental 
states for folk psychological explanations. But the 
introspectionism which EM presupposes for FP is neither 
connected with a transparency-of-the-mind-thesis, nor 
does it imply attributor-dependent heuristics. Anybody – 
including Martians – who adopts the conceptual system of 
FP and uses it for the explanation of cognitive processes 
and human behavior will have an introspective access to 
its mental states.  
This (introspectionist) conception of TT could help 
to interpret the empirical findings of Gopnik & Astington 
1988 and Gopnik & Wellman 1995 in a more moderate – 
that means less anti-introspectionist – way: From the fact 
that children develop the capacity to understand (or 
successfully ascribe) other person's mental states together 
with the capacity to understand their own mental states it 
need not be concluded that folk psychology does not rely 
upon the ability to introspect one's own mental states. It 
could also be interpreted in the following way: Both 
capacities emerge at the same time because children 
together with the folk psychological theory also acquire a 
new access to their own mental states – they learn to 
introspect. In introspection they obtain an access to some 
antecedent conditions of folk psychological explanations 
that they would not have without introspection. Thus, the 
folk psychological explanations children perform after 
acquiring this new conceptual framework essentially 
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